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VERSION:2.0
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CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
X-WR-CALNAME:Joint Public Economics and Applied Microeconomics  Workshop:  
 Eleonora Patacchini
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Eastern Time (US & Canada)
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260714T071938Z
UID:tag:localist.com\,2008:EventInstance_31775874005841
DTSTART:20191113T164000Z
DTEND:20191113T181000Z
DESCRIPTION:Eleonora Patacchini - Cornell University\n\nTitle:  Tax Profess
 ionals and Tax Evasion\n\nTo study the role of tax professionals\, we merg
 e tax records of the entire population of sole proprietorship taxpayers in
  Italy for seven fiscal years with the respective audit files from the tax
  revenue agency. Exploiting a peculiar feature of the Italian tax administ
 ration system\, we identify quasi-random variation in enforcement interven
 tions. We document that tax professionals generate informational externali
 ties that affect their clients' tax compliance\; and that taxpayers sort t
 hemselves into tax professionals of heterogeneous tolerance for tax evasio
 n. We also find that being audited increases the probability to change acc
 ountant in the following year whereas having at least another clients of t
 he same accountant audited decreases this probability. The results have im
 portant policy implications. We show that the indirect effect on reported 
 income of tax audits mediated by tax professionals is about 11 percent of 
 the direct effect\, but while the direct effect of tax audits is decreasin
 g over time the indirect effect is increasing over time. The dynamic spill
 over generated by tax professionals is therefore an important effect that 
 should be considered in the design of auditing schemes.
GEO:42.447296;-76.482254
LOCATION:Uris Hall\, 498
SUMMARY:Joint Public Economics and Applied Microeconomics  Workshop:  Eleon
 ora Patacchini
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.cornell.edu/event/workshop_appliedmicroeconomi
 cs_public_patacchini
CATEGORIES:Class/ Workshop
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