Why do some coercive demands succeed while others fail?

A dominant paradigm in the study of international relations explains coercive outcomes by pointing to the credibility and severity of threats. This lecture advances another paradigm called the Assurance Dilemma. Even highly credible and severe threats can fail when assurance is not credible. Coercers must assure their target that their threats are conditional on the target’s behavior. Yet, the actions that coercers take to bolster the credibility of their threats can undermine the credibility of their assurances not to punish the target. Cases of coercive bargaining over the nuclear programs of South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran demonstrate the logic and effectiveness of strategies of assurance. 

About the Speaker
Reid Pauly is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brown University and the Dean’s Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. He studies nuclear proliferation and nuclear strategy, coercion, and secrecy in international politics. His scholarship has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, the European Journal of International Relations, and Foreign Affairs. Pauly earned his Ph.D. from MIT and has held fellowships at the Belfer Center (Harvard Kennedy School) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (Stanford University). He is also a fellow with the Schmidt Futures International Strategy Forum. 

Host
Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflicts Studies