There is an oft-told story about the concept of strategic stability and the function of arms control. The conventional story says that stability was a condition inherent to the logic of nuclear deterrence, and that arms control was a project to restrain the superpower strategic competition and promote stability. This lecture revises that story in two ways. First, it shows that stability was a metaphor introduced to security studies from distant fields having nothing to do with the study of strategy.

Second, it shows that stability was used to rationalize policies that had little to do with restraint. It turns out that key early arms control thinkers held close relationships with ballistic missile contractors. Top science advisors to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations served as corporate board members and paid consultants to these companies. The scientists’ dual roles as employees of weapons contractors and as policy advisors were vulnerable to a strong conflict of interest.

The talk analyzes the impact of that conflict on US arms control policy and explores the techniques of concealment scientists and policymakers used to guard privileged financial arrangements.

About the Speaker
Benjamin Wilson is an Associate Professor of the History of Science at Harvard University. In 2025, he will publish a book with Harvard University Press about US strategists and science advisors during the Cold War.

Host
Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies

Co-host
Department of Science & Technology Studies