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X-WR-CALNAME:Seminar @ Cornell Tech: Somya Singhvi
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Eastern Time (US & Canada)
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DTSTAMP:20260517T122539Z
UID:tag:localist.com\,2008:EventInstance_32678505378871
DTSTART:20200212T160000Z
DTEND:20200212T170000Z
DESCRIPTION:"Improving Farmers’ Welfare on Online Agri-Platforms"\n\nMult
 iple developing countries have launched online platforms to unify geograph
 ically dispersed agriculture markets with the goal of improving smallholde
 r farmers’ welfare\, but very little is known about the resulting impact
  of such platforms. In this talk\, we describe a body of work that provide
 s the first rigorous impact assessment of such a platform\, and highlight 
 how innovative designs of price discovery mechanisms could be enabled by o
 nline agri-platforms in resource-constrained environments. The work is in 
 close collaboration with the state government of Karnataka\, India\, and i
 s focused on the state's online agri-platform\, the Unified Market Platfor
 m (UMP). By November 2019\, approximately 62.8 million metric tons of comm
 odities valued at $21.7 billion (USD) had been traded across 162 markets o
 n the UMP. Leveraging both public data and detailed bidding data from the 
 platform\, a difference-in-differences analysis suggests that the implemen
 tation of the UMP has significantly increased modal price of certain commo
 dities (5.1%-3.5%)\, while prices for other commodities have not changed. 
 Furthermore\, the analysis provides evidence that logistical challenges\, 
 bidding efficiency and low competition are important factors affecting the
  impact of UMP.\n\nIn order to further increase competition on UMP\, we ad
 opt a multi-method approach to design\, implement\, and evaluate the impac
 t of a new two-stage auction on UMP. The design of the two-stage auction i
 s informed by operational constraints and guided by theory-informed\, semi
 -structured interviews with traders in the field. A new behavioral auction
  model is developed to determine when the two-stage auction can generate a
  higher revenue for farmers than the traditional single-stage\, first-pric
 e\, sealed-bid auction. The two-stage auction was implemented on the UMP f
 or a major lentils market in February 2019. By June 2019\, commodities wor
 th more than $6 million (USD) had been traded under the new auction design
 . A difference-in-differences analysis demonstrates that the implementatio
 n has yielded a significant 4.7% price increase\, representing profit impr
 ovement of 60%-158% for over 10\,000 farmers who traded in the treatment m
 arket. The detailed auction data provides empirical validation of the beha
 vioral auction model.\n\n \n\nBio:\n\nSomya Singhvi is a fifth-year PhD st
 udent at the MIT\, Operations Research Center where he is being advised by
  Prof. Retsef Levi and Prof. Yanchong Zheng. His research focuses on devel
 oping data-driven analytics and decision support tools to improve operatio
 nal efficiency and social welfare in agricultural supply chains and market
 s of developing countries. These research projects are in collaboration wi
 th multiple public and private organizations that are working with smallho
 lder farmers. Prior to attending MIT\, Somya received a BS (2015) in Opera
 tions Research and Engineering from Cornell University.
LOCATION:Cornell Tech\, Bloomberg Center
SUMMARY:Seminar @ Cornell Tech: Somya Singhvi
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.cornell.edu/event/seminar_cornell_tech_somya_s
 inghvi
CATEGORIES:Seminar
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