Ray Briggs, Stanford University

Title: Counterpossible Triviality, Potentiality, and Actuality

Abstract: Counterfactual conditionals are closely connected to scientifically important things in the actual world: causation, dispositions, and scientific explanation.  The standard semantics for counterfactuals requires us to evaluate what happens at possible worlds where their antecedents are true. Trouble arises when we consider counterpossibles (counterfactuals whose antecedents are impossible). On the standard semantics, they come out as trivially true. Yet some counterpossibles express non-trivial scientific truths about the world around us, and others express non-trivial scientific falsehoods. The trouble is even worse on certain "hardcore actualist" theories, which entail that metaphysical impossibilities are even more common than commonly assumed.

I'll argue that an impossible-worlds semantics should be particularly attractive to hardcore actualists, and that they may benefit from refusing to draw a firm distinction between possible and impossible worlds.

Discussion Club is a lecture series hosted by the Sage School of Philosophy