Do acts of military insubordination affect states’ ability to prevent foreign aggression? Muhib Rahman, Cornell University, argues that military mutiny makes a state more vulnerable to international coercion. Mutinies help foreign adversaries differentiate weak targets from strong ones by “affecting” and “revealing” states’ war-fighting costs and resolve. They disrupt the military command structure and thus increase the costs of organizing well-coordinated defense against foreign threats.

Mutinies also act as an informative signal and reveal two sets of critical information. First, they make it public that the disruptions weakened command and control. Second, they expose deeper, systematic issues within the state apparatus that set the stage for the mutiny. As a strategic actor, the military is more likely to attempt a mutiny when it expects the government to be weaker and more amenable to making concessions. This strategic timing is informative for foreign adversaries, as it signals that the government’s resolve is low and allows them to distinguish weak targets from strong ones. The more severe the mutiny, the larger the effects. They have a greater effect on command structures and can draw significantly more international attention.

The author's quantitative analyses show that military mutinies (a) increase the likelihood that the state is targeted in a militarized interstate dispute, (b) decrease the likelihood of its resistance once the MID is initiated, and (c) more severe mutinies have stronger effects on state vulnerability to external coercion. The paper advances our understanding of how civil-military relations affect states’ external threat environment. It also underscores the dynamic role of private information in international conflict processes.

About the Speaker
Dr. Muhib Rahman is a Postdoctoral Associate at Cornell University, affiliated with the Department of Government and the Gender and Security Sector Lab. His research intersects international security, civil-military relations, and democratic governance. He examines how interstate crisis bargaining and defense cooperation affect government-military conflicts in domestic politics, focusing on elite defection and anti-government armed uprisings. He is also interested in understanding how civil-military relations influence states’ external threat environment and interstate conflict processes, especially in the Global South.

The Hayek Fund has supported Dr. Rahman’s work at the Institute for Humane Studies, the Marcus Foundation, the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies, and the Clements Center for National Security. His research has been published in journals such as Foreign Policy Analysis and International Interactions, and he is revising manuscripts for the Journal of Conflict Resolution and Security Studies. He holds an M.A. in Political Science from McGill University and a Ph.D. in Government from the University of Texas at Austin.

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Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies