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Tuesday, November 12, 2019 at 4:15pm to 5:45pm
Uris Hall, 498
Liyan Yang - University of Toronto (visiting Johns Hopkins University)
Abstract: I study voluntary disclosure of duopoly firms when they learn information from asset prices. By disclosing information, a firm incurs a cost of losing competitive advantage to its rival firm but benefits from learning from a more informative asset market. Three types of equilibrium arise: nondisclosure, partial disclosure, and full disclosure. In a partial disclosure equilibrium, price informativeness and firm profits increase with the size of noise trading in the financial market. In the other two types of equilibrium, the opposite is true. Firms’ disclosure decisions can exhibit strategic complementarity, leading to both a disclosure equilibrium and a nondisclosure equilibrium.