The Metaphysical Basis of Aristotle's Logic

Marko Malink (New York University)

Abstract: According to Bertrand Russell, the first serious advance in logic since the time of the Greeks was made by Gottlob Frege, who argued that the propositions "Socrates is mortal" and "All humans are mortal" are not of the same logical form. Aristotle, by contrast, took these propositions to be of the same logical form. According to Aristotle, both are simple categorical propositions in which one being is predicated of another being, universal or particular. In this talk, I will argue that Aristotle adopted this view because he thought that it provides a metaphysically perspicuous representation of the structure of beings underlying demonstrative science. Thus, while his system of categorical logic does not possess the deductive and expressive power of Frege's system, it is well suited for representing what Aristotle took to be explanatory scientific demonstrations.