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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:icalendar-ruby
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
X-WR-CALNAME:Labor Economics Workshop: Sam Dodini
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Eastern Time (US & Canada)
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260814T120749Z
UID:tag:localist.com\,2008:EventInstance_34421254316249
DTSTART:20201019T153000Z
DTEND:20201019T170000Z
DESCRIPTION:Sam Dodini\, Cornell University - Practice Job Talk\n\nMaking a
 nd Breaking Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Door-to-Door Sa
 les \n\nAbstract: This paper uses novel\, comprehensive data from a pest c
 ontrol sales company to examine how principals affect reference dependence
  in a principal-agent setting. I provide evidence that lump-sum bonuses in
 centivize workers to set specific long-run expectations\, which workers tr
 anslate to daily performance references consistent with theories of goal-s
 etting. Daily labor supply kinks significantly downward at candidate refer
 ences during normal workdays. However\, during individual rank-order tourn
 aments\, there is no such kink\, and labor supply is notably flat across t
 he reference. This is attributable to workers anchoring their labor supply
  to a new reference--their opponent--consistent with tournament theory. In
 dividual rank-order tournaments strategically break reference dependence a
 nd increase labor supply in the gain domain. Through their choice of contr
 act structure and short-run incentives\, firms exert influence over the re
 ferences workers set and therefore their daily labor supply choices.
LOCATION:
SUMMARY:Labor Economics Workshop: Sam Dodini
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.cornell.edu/event/labor_economics_workshop_sam
 _dodini
CATEGORIES:Seminar
CATEGORIES:Class/ Workshop
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