BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:icalendar-ruby
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
X-WR-CALNAME:Joint Econometrics & Industrial Organization Workshop: Victor 
 Aguirregabiria
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Eastern Time (US & Canada)
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260714T073929Z
UID:tag:localist.com\,2008:EventInstance_30476678468633
DTSTART:20191030T154000Z
DTEND:20191030T171000Z
DESCRIPTION:Victor Aguirregabiria - University of Toronto & CEPR\n\nIdentif
 ication of Non-Equilibrium Beliefs in Games of Incomplete Information Usin
 g Experimental Data (joint w/Erhao Xie)\n\nAbstract:  This paper studies t
 he identification of players. preferences and beliefs in discrete choice g
 ames using experimental data. The experiment comprises a set of games that
  differ in their matrices of monetary payoffs. The researcher is intereste
 d in the identification of preferences (utility of money) and beliefs on t
 he opponents’ expected behavior\, without imposing equilibrium restricti
 ons or parametric assumptions on utility and belief functions. We show tha
 t the hypothesis of unbiased/rational beliefs is testable as long as the s
 et of games in the experiment imply variation in monetary payoffs of other
  players\, keeping the own monetary payoff constant.  We present condition
 s for the full identification of utility and belief functions at the indiv
 idual level - without restrictions on players\; heterogeneity in preferenc
 es or beliefs. We apply our method to data from two experiments: a matchin
 g pennies game\, and a public good game.
GEO:42.447296;-76.482254
LOCATION:Uris Hall\, 498
SUMMARY:Joint Econometrics & Industrial Organization Workshop: Victor Aguir
 regabiria
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.cornell.edu/event/joint_econometrics_industria
 l_organization_workshop_victor_aguirregabiria
CATEGORIES:Class/ Workshop
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR