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Wednesday, March 3, 2021 at 11:15am to 12:45pm
Virtual EventKei Kawai, University of California, Berkeley
Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
Abstract: Cartels participating in procurement auctions frequently use bid rotation or prioritize incumbents to allocate market shares. However, establishing a link betweenobserved allocation patterns and firm conduct has been difficult: there are cost based competitive explanations for such patterns. We show that by focusing on auctions inwhich the winning and losing bids are very close, it is possible to distinguish allocation patterns reflecting cost differences across firms from patterns reflecting non-competitive environments. We apply our tests to two datasets: the sample of Ohio milk auctions studied in Porter and Zona (1999), and a sample of municipal procurement auctions from Japan.
Dial-In Information
If you are interested participating in this seminar, please email Ulrike Kroeller at uab1@cornell.edu for Zoom information.
Ulrike Kroeller
Kei Kawai
University of California, Berkeley
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