E.J. Green, PhD

Miller Associate Professor

William H. Miller III Department of Psychology

Johns Hopkins University

Perceptual Categorization and Perceptual Concepts

The idea that there is a distinction between perceiving and thinking is built into our commonsense conception of the mind, presupposed by longstanding philosophical debates, and enshrined in psychology textbooks. But if there is a perception-cognition border, how should it be characterized? Recently, several theorists have proposed that the perception-cognition border consists partly in the fact that perception and cognition deploy fundamentally different kinds of mental representations. In particular, it is often claimed that perceptual representations are necessarily non-conceptual while cognitive representations are not. Roughly, this means that the representations we use for processes like inference, practical reasoning, and planning are wholly unavailable to perception. This position contrasts with Conceptualism, the view that at least some perceptual representation is conceptual.

In this talk I will first distinguish some alternative versions of Conceptualism that are often run together, highlighting their different empirical commitments. Then, after discussing some brief considerations in favor of Conceptualism, I consider a prominent empirical argument against the view due to Ned Block. The argument appeals to patterns of color representation in infants, alleging that infants exhibit perceptual categorization of color while failing to deploy concepts of color categories. I argue that Conceptualism survives Block’s challenge. Nonetheless, the challenge is instructive because it encourages us to reflect more carefully on the various things one might mean by “perceptual categorization,” and how (if at all) perceptual categorization may differ from full-blown conceptualization. I offer some thoughts on this issue.