BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:icalendar-ruby
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
X-WR-CALNAME:CFEM Seminar: Ciamac Moallemi (Columbia) - Monopoly without a 
 Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Eastern Time (US & Canada)
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260907T234232Z
UID:tag:localist.com\,2008:EventInstance_3295018
DTSTART:20180207T230000Z
DTEND:20180208T000000Z
DESCRIPTION:Watch the seminar at https://cornell.mediasite.com/Mediasite/Pl
 ay/adef75b1ee544e5792a3d684e3e136f31d?catalog=02711d4b-45d2-40aa-acc2-a1b5
 274615d6\n\n \n\nOwned by nobody and controlled by an almost immutable pro
 tocol\, the Bitcoin cryptocurrency payment system is a platform with two m
 ain constituencies: users\, who make and receive payments\; and\nprofit-se
 eking miners\, who maintain the system's infrastructure. We seek to unders
 tand the economics of the system: How does the system raise revenue to pay
  for its infrastructure? How are usage fees determined? How much infrastru
 cture is deployed? What are the implications of changing parameters in the
  protocol?\n\nTo address these questions\, we offer and analyze an economi
 c model of a cryptocurrency system featuring user-generated transaction fe
 es\, and focus on Bitcoin as the leading example. These fees\, as well as 
 the system’s infrastructure level (number of servers in use)\, are deter
 mined in an equilibrium of a congestion-queueing game derived from the sys
 tem's limited throughput. The system eliminates dead-weight loss from mono
 poly\, but introduces other inefficiencies. Namely\, the system requires s
 ignificant congestion to raise revenue and fund infrastructure. In the abs
 ence of significant congestion\, meaningful transaction-fee generation wil
 l cease\, and in the long-term the cryptocurrency system will risk collaps
 e. Moreover\, the current design of the system\, specifically the processi
 ng of large but infrequent blocks of transactions\, makes the system less 
 efficient at\nraising revenue.\n\nThe analysis leads to design suggestions
  for future cryptocurrencies.\n\nThis is joint work with Gur Huberman and 
 Jacob D. Leshno.\n\n \n\nBio: Ciamac C. Moallemi is an Associate Professor
  of Business in the Decision\, Risk\, and Operations Division of the Gradu
 ate School of Business at Columbia University\, where he has been since\n2
 007. He received S.B. degrees in electrical engineering & computer science
  and in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1996).
  He studied at the University of Cambridge\,\nwhere he earned a Master of 
 Advanced Study degree in mathematics (Part III of the Mathematical Tripos)
 \, with distinction (1997). He received a Ph.D. in electrical engineering 
 from Stanford University (2007). Prior to his doctoral studies\, he develo
 ped quantitative methods in a number of entrepreneurial ventures: as a par
 tner in a $200 million fixed-income arbitrage hedge fund and as the direct
 or of scientific computing at an early-stage drug discovery start-up. He h
 olds editorial positions at the journals Operations Research and Managemen
 t Science. He is a member of INFORMS. He is a past recipient of the Britis
 h Marshall Scholarship (1996)\, the Benchmark Stanford Graduate Fellowship
  (2003)\, first place in the INFORMS Junior Faculty Paper Competition (201
 1)\, and the Best Simulation Publication Award of the INFORMS Simulation S
 ociety (2014). His research interests are in the area of the optimization 
 and control of large-scale stochastic systems and decision-making under un
 certainty\, with an emphasis on applications in financial engineering.
LOCATION:Cornell Tech\, 2 W Loop Rd\, New York\, NY 10044\, Bloomberg 061
SUMMARY:CFEM Seminar: Ciamac Moallemi (Columbia) - Monopoly without a Monop
 olist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.cornell.edu/event/cfem_seminar_ciamac_moallemi
 _columbia_-_monopoly_without_a_monopolist_an_economic_analysis_of_the_bitc
 oin_payment_system
CATEGORIES:Seminar
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END:VCALENDAR