Cornell University

Junior Recruitment Workshop: Isaias Chaves Villamizar

Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:40am to 1:10pm

Ives Hall, 115
B07 Tower Rd, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA

Isaias Chaves Villamizar - Stanford University

Privacy in Bargaining: The Case of Endogenous Entry

Abstract: I study the role of privacy in bargaining. A seller makes offers every instant, without commitment, to a privately informed buyer. There are potential competing buyers who observe the negotiation and can choose to enter, triggering a bidding war. When the skimming of buyer types is good news for entrants, hiding offers from them uniformly raises transaction prices and slows down trade. It makes high-valuation buyers worse off. It typically makes the seller better off. Having the ability to lure in competition by making public offers can therefore hurt the seller when she cannot commit to future prices. More generally, I show that the effects of privacy mainly depend on whether the skimming of buyer types encourages or discourages entry. Regardless of the effect of skimming on entry, when the offers are private, trade happens in dribs and drabs only, with the seller screening buyers one by one, whereas when offers are public, the equilibrium can alternate between bursts of trade, when a positive mass of buyer types accepts in an instant, and dribs and drabs of trade.

Event Type

Seminar, Class/ Workshop

Departments

Economics

Tags

economics, EconSeminar, EconMetrics, EconMacro, EconPublic, EconIO, EconDevelop, EconRecruit, EconBehave, EconMicro

Contact E-Mail

alg5@cornell.edu

Contact Name

Amy Moesch

Contact Phone

607-255-5617

Speaker

Isaias Chaves Villamizar

Speaker Affiliation

Stanford University

Open To

Cornell Economics Community (List Serve Members)

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